There is significant information asymmetry in the IT outsourcing market. Clients have uncertainty about vendors' capabilities and vendors' have uncertainty about clients' requirements. Prior literature has examined many devices to reduce such information asymmetry: vendor reputation, client-vendor prior relationship, CMM rating of the vendors, location of vendor, and technological diversity of the vendor. We examine the impact of a hitherto unconsidered device -the use of an advisor. In the context of global sourcing, third party advisors with their accumulated knowledge of client requirements and the vendor landscape can mitigate the information asymmetry between clients and vendors. However, in an extensive dataset of IT outsourcing contracts going back two decades we found the use of advisors to be rare (less than 5% of contracts go through an advisor).
Introduction
IT outsourcing is a very large industry. Gartner's 2012 analysis sized the worldwide IT services market at 991 billion dollars per annum. However, different industry reports suggest that about half of the IT outsourcing contracts are renegotiated (Gartner, 2010; Computer Weekly, 2012) . Similarly, other industry studies indicate that a very large proportion of outsourcing contracts are cancelled (Infosys 2011) . Industry reports commonly blame poor customer service, lack of flexibility on the part of the vendor, and hidden costs for clients' inability to achieve the goals of outsourcing initiatives (Craig and Willmort 2005; McDougall, 2006) . Poor service, lack of flexibility, and hidden costs can be attributed to the tension that exists in a typical outsourcing relationship where the client seeks a service at lower than the in-house cost and the vendor who wants to maximize its profits (Tadelis 2007) . Given this natural tension between the client and the vendor, the IT outsourcing vendor must be selected carefully and the outsourcing contract must be designed assiduously. However, there is significant information asymmetry in the IT outsourcing market that makes the selection of vendors and contracting for IT projects especially challenging. For instance, clients' may understand their requirements to satisfy client's requirements it may lead to cancellation or renegotiation of the contract. In this paper, we examine the hitherto unexplored role of third party advisors, a growing cottage industry, in mitigating such information asymmetry.
Prior to this research, different tools and devices have been studied to mitigate the information asymmetries in the IT outsourcing market. For example, prior relationship with a vendor, and experience and reputation of a vendor may mitigate a client's information asymmetry about a vendor's capabilities (Gao et. al. 2010 ). The vendor location/distance may also reduce information asymmetry. For example, US-based clients may have lower information asymmetry about US-based vendors compared to overseas vendors (Gao et. al. 2010) . Similarly, third party certification of vendors e.g., CMM ratings (Gopal and Gao 2009 ) may mitigate the information asymmetry about the vendor's software development capabilities. The IT outsourcing literature has examined how vendors can use devices such as prior relationship with clients, vendors' experience and reputation, vendors' location, service diversification, and CMM certification to signal quality and reduce information asymmetry (Gao et al. 2010; Gopal and Gao 2009 ). We add to this stream of research by examining the role of third party advisors, such as TPI, Avasant and specific divisions of Ernst and Young and KPMG,
to name a few 1 , towards reducing information asymmetry in IT outsourcing.
The information asymmetry between clients and vendors and the difficulties in defining the scope and performance of outsourced work gives rise to opportunities for specialist third party advisors to intermediate between clients and vendors. Third party advisors can use their accumulated knowledge of the vendor space to match client requirements with vendor capabilities, help clients choose which global location matches their needs, help design appropriate outsourcing contracts, and get the best deal available in the market for both clients and vendors. If third party advisors, by virtue of their market knowledge, are able to match clients with the right vendors and design appropriate contracts, then even when advisors work on behalf of clients, advisors can help vendors secure more outsourcing contracts and help clients and vendors achieve more positive contracting outcomes. Yet, despite the presence of big-players (such as KPMG) in a rapidly growing IT outsourcing industry, the actual use of third-party advisors is in low single digit percentages over the last two decades. This suggests uncertainty in their value proposition and motivates us to address the issue of quantifying their impact as an open empirical question using a variety of econometric specifications. In particular, this paper investigates the impact of third party advisors on vendors' revenues and contract outcomes.
Our analysis, using 753 large IT outsourcing contracts from 1989-2009, suggests that the presence of advisor acts as a tool to reduce information asymmetry between clients and vendors and benefits both clients and vendors. The presence of advisor is associated with higher annual revenues for vendors. Furthermore, the presence of advisors is associated with higher likelihood of contract extension and expansion. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section details the institutional context and the various tensions that could drive outcomes for clients and vendors in different directions; section three discusses the data, empirical approach, and results; and section four discusses the implications of the findings.
Institutional Background
A large body of IT outsourcing literature (Han and Nault 2011; Koh et al. 2004; Susarla et al. 2010 Susarla et al. , 2012 recognizes the difficulties in writing IT outsourcing contracts and suggests that IT outsourcing contracts are inevitably incomplete. In many cases the agency issues in IT outsourcing contracts arise due to information asymmetry between clients and vendors. While clients lack the ability to judge vendors' capabilities, vendors too lack the ability to signal their capabilities to clients (Gopal and Gao, 2009; Spence 1973) . The literature has examined how vendors could use devices such as their experience and reputation, prior relationship with clients, their location/distance from the client, and their CMM rating to signal quality (Gao et al. 2010; Gopal and Gao 2009 ). Given the information asymmetry between clients and vendors, and the difficulties in defining the scope and performance of outsourced work, specialist third party advisors, such as TPI, Everest and NeoIT are sometimes used by clients to set up outsourcing engagements. Third party advisors with knowledge of the IT outsourcing market can match clients' specific requirements with vendors with the right capabilities to meet those requirements (Chan 1983; Bailey and Bakos 1997) . Table 1 summarizes the mechanisms through which advisors reduce information asymmetry and creates value in the IT outsourcing market.
Impact of Advisor on Vendors
Prior work has examined how rating information such as CMM ratings, vendor's location, service diversification, prior relationship with the client, and reputation can mitigate information asymmetry. As summarized in Table 1 
Impact of Advisor on Contract Outcome
The IT outsourcing literature has examined the drivers of outsourcing success, specifically the impact of and the balance between formal/structural controls such as reporting arrangements and penalty clauses, and informal controls such as trust and interpersonal relationships (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Gopal and Gosain 2010; Kirsch 2004; Levina 2005; Levina and Vaast 2005) . Sabherwal (1999) argues that both structural and informal controls are vital for performance of contacts. Further, the balance between formal and informal control improves outcomes and too much focus on either can hurt performance. The IT outsourcing literature has also examined customer satisfaction with IT outsourcing (e.g., Mani et al. 2012 ) and profitability of the project for the vendor (e.g., Gopal et al. 2003) . However, while contracting has been studied at the point of signing the contract, large IT outsourcing contracts are not transactional, rather they are long-term relationships.
Outcomes that are realized over longer time horizons are important to study in the context of complex interorganizational relationships. Thus, in this paper we study the outcomes of large contracts (average size ~350 Million) in the long-term.
It is believed that the likelihood of contract success depends on a number of project, client, and vendor characteristics. Controlling for project, client, and vendor characteristics, the presence of advisor may also influence project success. Again, the reader is referred to Susarla et al (2010) . Thus, firm size measured as customer revenue (CustomerRevenue) is used as a proxy for the resources of the client that can brought to bear on the project.
NumberofSubsegments

Vendor/Advisor Variables:
The capabilities, revenue and, reputation of the vendor is measured as the annual dollar value (VendorRevenue) of all the IT contracts signed by the vendor, in the signing year of the contract under consideration. The claim here is that vendors with lower information asymmetry about their capabilities will have higher annual value of contracts signed by the vendor. Age is the numerical age of the vendor in years at the time of signing the contract. The process maturity of the vendor is assessed as the CMM rating of the vendor (CMMRating). Most clients in the data are US-based clients. The cultural and physical distance of the vendor is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 for US-based vendors and a value of 0 for non-US-based vendors. Diversity is a measure of the different kinds of projects or tasks executed by a vendor (Gao et al. 2010) . It is computed every year based on the number of subsegments a vendor has worked on in that year. It is the average of NumberofSubsegments (which is a proxy for distinct IT tasks involved in the outsourcing project) of all the projects executed by the vendor in the year of the project under consideration. Table 2 presents the summary statistics and correlations between the key variables.
Econometric Model and Results
We first examine the relationship between the presence of advisor in project k ( / , ) and vendor j's revenue ( , ) in period t defined as the year in which the contract was signed. We treat advisor selection as endogenous and use a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) model to predict vendor revenue.
( Equation (1) is the advisor selection model. This model suggests that a client i may choose an advisor based on how experienced they are at IT outsourcing at time t ( , ), how large ( , ) and complex ( , ) the project is, and how many different tasks and activities are involved in the project ( , ). We expect clients to use advisors when they lack IT outsourcing experience and thus are not very familiar with the vendor landscape.
We also expect clients to use advisors for large and complex projects, and projects that involve a number of distinct tasks and activities.
Equation (2) is the vendor revenue model. A vendor j's revenue is a function of different devices available to reduce information asymmetry about the vendor. Thus, we predict vendor revenue based on how long the vendor has been in business ( , ), the technological capabilities of the vendor ( , ), the maturity of the vendor's software development process ( , ), whether the vendor is a US-based vendor ( / , ), and the strength of the client-vendor prior relationship ( ℎ ℎ , ), if any. We expect the information asymmetry about the vendor to be lower (and vendor revenue to be higher) when the vendor is older and has been in business for longer, the vendor has the experience to execute projects that include different types of tasks and activities, the vendor is a US-based vendor, and the client and vendor have worked with each other in the past such that the client is aware of the vendor's capabilities and the vendor understands the client's requirements. We are most interested in the relationship between the presence of advisor in a project and vendor revenue.
Results from the 2SLS model (see Table 3 ) indicate that larger contracts (ContractValue) and contracts with higher number of distinct IT tasks and activities (NumberofSubsegments) are more likely to use an advisor. The vendor revenue model indicates that the presence of advisor (Advisor Y/N) is associated with an increase in vendor revenues. Consistent with prior research (Gao et al. 2010 ) this analysis also indicates that CMM rating (CMM), location and physical and cultural distance of the vendor (USY/N) and task diversity (Diversity) are also positively associated with vendor revenue.
We next examine the relationship between the presence of advisor in project k and project outcome. We again treat advisor selection as endogenous and use a bivariate probit model (see equation (3) and (4)) to predict the project outcome. Equation (3) is the advisor selection model. It is the same model as equation (1). Equations (3) and (4) In the dataset an advisor is used in about 5% of the contracts. The small number of contracts with advisors may (potentially) bias the results of the analysis examining the relationship between presence of advisor and contract outcome. According to King and Zheng (1999a , 1999b , 2001 ) when faced with rare events (e.g., wars, senate confirmation denials etc.) standard logit models face the issue of prediction bias and underestimate the probability of rare events. To mitigate this concern a rare event logit model is proposed by King and Zheng (1999a , 1999b , 2001 . In this approach data collection involves collecting data on all possible occurrences of 1 as well as a random selection of 0's from the sample. This approach is called choice based sampling. That is, first collect all 1's from the sample and then randomly collect about an equal number of 0's from the sample.
In our case we first collected all 1's from the sample and then randomly collected 5% of 0's from the 0's sample.
We then apply the relogit procedure (Tomz et al. 1999) on the choice based sample to correct for the prediction bias issue faced by standard logit models. Column 1 in Table 5 shows the results with the basic logit procedure and column 2 shows the results with the rare event logit procedure applied to correct the bias. Results of rare event logit model (column2) are consistent with the bivariate probit analysis. This analysis indicates that though around 5% of the contracts in the dataset used an advisor, advisors have a positive impact on contract outcome.
Robustness Analyses
We conduct a series of robustness analysis using alternative approaches and find consistency in the direction and significance of our main results 2 . We begin by using a 3SLS specification and follow that by showing the same results using a propensity score matching framework as well as a coarsened exact matching (CEM) procedure that has attractive statistical properties. Further, we repeat all our analysis by dropping contract renegotiation as a negative outcome as it can be argued that some contracts are better off by getting renegotiated (say to account for technological change).
We are motivated to consider the 3SLS specification as it can be argued that advisor selection, vendor revenues, and project outcomes are determined simultaneously. Thus, we treat advisor selection (equation 1 3 We also calculate vendor revenue by excluding the value of the contract under consideration from vendor revenue and re-run the 2SLS and 3SLS analysis. These analyses produce very consistent results.
In the next subsection we test the robustness of our findings using an alternative 'counter-factual' based approach that compares the 'treatment' effect of working with an advisor versus not for statistically, observably 4 similar IT outsourcing contracts.
Propensity Score Matching
To further demonstrate robustness of our results we use propensity score matching, a technique that allows the researcher to reduce model dependence in making inference about treatment effects (Ho et al 2007) . Propensity score matching is a way to correct the estimation of treatment effect after controlling for the existence of other confounding factors, based on the idea that the bias is reduced when the comparison of outcomes is performed using similar treated and controlled observations (Roseanbaum and Rubin 1983, Dehejia and Wahba 2002).
The propensity score is the probability of receiving treatment (in our case advisor), conditional on the observable covariates, X. The idea is to compare entities, who based on observables have a very similar probability of receiving treatment (similar propensity score), but one of them received the treatment and the other did not. Technically, our preprocessed propensity scored dataset will be a subset of the observed sample for which the treatment group and control group will have the same background characteristics, or:
We then have reason to believe that we obtain an accurate causal effect that is relatively model free (Ho et al 2007) .
To implement this, we first compute the propensity score (see Table A2 in the online appendix) using the same variables we used earlier in equation 1 for advisor selection, as we expect clients to use advisors when they lack IT outsourcing experience, for large and complex projects, and projects that involve a number of distinct tasks and activities. Next we use the Kernel matching estimator (Heckman et al 1997 (Heckman et al , 1998 ; Mithas and Krishnan 2009) that uses multiple control contracts to construct each of the matched contracts leading to reduced variance of the estimator. The idea of Kernel matching is to obtain counterfactuals by weighted average of all control contracts where weights are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of treatment and control contracts. We compare the average treatment effect of contracts with advisor, to contracts without advisor but within the common support region. The results suggest that contract success is 24% more likely with the presence of advisor and the vendor revenue is likely to be higher by approximately $6B with the presence of advisor (see Table A3 in the online appendix). Note that this estimate is based on the average treatment effect representing the total vendor revenue that can be attributed to advisors for all matched contracts where the average contract size is over $358M. While our inference does not extend to smaller contracts, it is likely that for such contracts the role of the advisor is not pertinent.
Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
An added advantage of the propensity score pre-processing that we did is that it allows us to assess the treatment effect heterogeneity (Dahejia and Wahba 2002) . Specifically, we answer the following two questions, 1) do all contracts benefit equally by the presence of advisor and 2) do advisors impact the revenue of all vendors equally.
To do this, we classified the sample into three strata within which the propensity score for contracts with and without advisor are not significantly different. Intuitively, the differences among strata are in terms of number of subsegments. Strata 1 has few, about 2 subsegments, strata 2 has about 3 subsegments and strata 3 has more, about 5 subsegments. Table A4 in the online appendix presents the mean of treatment (with advisor) and control group (without advisor) before matching and Table A5 in the online appendix presents the mean of treatment (with advisor) and control group (without advisor) after matching. Means reported in Table A5 shows that contracts with and without advisor are similar in terms of their characteristics after matching. This similarity allows us to directly compare the impact of advisor on contract outcome as well as vendor revenue. Table A6 in the online appendix shows the impact of advisor on outcome and vendor revenue for each stratum. Our results suggest that in stratum 1, contract success is 22% more likely and the vendor revenue is higher by 6.23B with advisor. In stratum 2, contract success is 26% more likely and vendor revenue is higher by 5.87B with advisor and in stratum 3, contract success is 34% more likely and vendor revenue is higher by 5.43B with the advisor. It seems that as the number of subsegments increases, the treatment effect of advisor increases the likelihood of contract success, though as the number of subsegment increases the presence of an advisor results in vendor revenue increases by lower amounts.
Sensitivity Analysis
To examine the impact of unobserved factors on the probability that a contract is in treatment group we conduct sensitivity analysis (Rosenbaum 1999 Table A7 in the online appendix) that our estimates for contract outcome become sensitive when Γ =1.75 (i.e., contracts with the same observed factors differ in the propensity for advisor selection by 75%) and for vendor revenue become sensitive when Γ =2 (i.e., contracts with the same observed factors differ in the propensity for advisor selection by 100%). Thus, we believe that we have captured most key variables which drive advisor selection and our results are not driven by unobserved variables.
Coarsened Exact Matching
Next, we apply Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) procedure (Iacus et al 2011 (Iacus et al ,2012 . CEM coarsens the observed covariates in order to perform an exact match on the coarsened data. In the next step the original uncoarsened but matched data is used to perform the analysis (Blackwell 2009 ). CEM (Iacus et al 2012 ) is a part of general class of methods known as the "monotonic imbalance bounding" (MIB) and has beneficial statistical properties compared to methods under the umbrella of "equal percent bias reducing" (EPBR) models (Rubin 1976) , of which Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is an example. CEM generates solutions that are better balanced and have lower estimation error compared to propensity score based matching method. CEM works differently than PSM as it chooses a fixed level of imbalance ex ante and hope that the number of observations left as a result of the procedure is sufficiently large. On the other hand PSM chooses a fixed number of observations ex ante and hope for imbalance reduction as part of the procedure. Table A8 
Discussion and Conclusion
There exist significant information asymmetries in IT outsourcing between clients and vendors. IT outsourcing projects are also hard to scope. This gives rise to opportunities for third party advisors to intermediate between clients and vendors. Such third party advisors can help clients by using their knowledge of the vendor space to match client requirements with vendor capabilities and design appropriate contracts. However, whether and how advisors create value in IT outsourcing was hitherto unaddressed in the literature. Our empirical analysis suggests that advisors can reduce information asymmetry between clients and vendors. We find evidence that supports the expectation that by appropriately matching client requirements with vendor capabilities, advisors are associated with higher revenue for vendors and higher likelihood of contract success. A number of devices have been discussed in the literature about how to mitigate information asymmetry: CMM ratings, vendor location, vendor reputation, technological diversity, etc. The key contribution of this paper is to examine the presence of advisor, in mitigating this information asymmetry.
In the models examining the impact of advisor on contract outcome, the competitive intensity of the bidding process has a negative impact on contract outcome. This suggests that if advisors make the bidding process more competitive in order to secure a good deal for the client, the client may pay the price at the back end of the project. In other words, advisors have to balance between finding a vendor to satisfy the client's technical requirements, helping the client specify an appropriate contract, and monitoring vendor behavior;
with the goal of securing a good financial deal for the client with a competitive bidding process.
This study has certain limitations that suggest avenues for future research. The study is limited in that we do not have access to contract outcomes for all the contracts in the Services Contract Database (SCD). The mean contract value for the data used in this analysis is $359 million, whereas the mean contract value for the entire dataset excluding the ones used in the analysis is $71.4 million. Thus, caution may be used when extending the findings of the current analysis to small and mid-size projects. It is likely that our findings hold only for larger projects where advisors are more likely to be used. However, we find evidence that link contract value and contract failure, thus it is reasonable to assume that these high value contracts would have been under greater scrutiny at the time of signing and would have attracted higher managerial attention as compared to the average contract in the SCD data. The same factor furthers the salience of the analysis; observe that the practice of restricting attention to high stakes contracts has been prevalent in the IT outsourcing literature (Barua, Mani and Whinston 2011 restrict their attention to the 100 top IT and BPO deals over the period 1995 and 2006).
At the expense of generalizability, our analysis provides a more virile petri-dish to examine an interesting phenomenon that has not examined by the prior literature.
This study examines the impact of advisors on vendor revenue and contract outcomes. However, many other questions remain unanswered. There is an issue of allegiance: who hires and pays the advisor: the client or the vendor. It is likely that advisors strive to meet the goals of the party that hires and pays them, typically the client. The analysis seems to suggest that if the advisor focuses on a good match between client requirements and vendor capabilities, advisors are associated with higher revenues for vendors, and better contract outcomes which benefit clients and vendors. However, if advisors make the bidding process more competitive, it may hurt vendor revenues as well as project outcomes that do not benefit the client or the vendor. Table 1 summarizes the advisor activities that help in mitigating information asymmetry. However, the empirical analysis does not disentangle the contribution of individual force/mechanisms. It is important to examine the specific force/mechanisms through which advisors affect vendor revenue and contract outcome.
It is likely that the vendor capability assessment and client-vendor matching influences vendor revenues; whereas client-vendor matching and moral hazard reduction influence contract outcome. Two of the findings of this research also raise questions for future research. The analysis suggests that CMM ratings are positively associated with vendor revenues. This is consistent with prior research that CMM ratings reduce information asymmetry about the maturity of vendors' software development methodology and thus are positively related with vendor revenues. However, CMM rating has a negative impact on contract outcome. Though prior research suggests that CMM ratings are associated with lower error rates, CMM ratings are also associated with longer development time and effort (Harter et al. 2000) . It is plausible that a longer development time and effort may sometimes lead to contract cancellation or renegotiation. Nevertheless, this finding requires further investigation.
In the contract outcome models, the outsourcing experience of the client has a negative impact on contract outcome. Our prior expectation was that clients with significant outsourcing experience would have developed routines to monitor projects executed in partnership with vendors and therefore would be more likely to achieve positive contract outcome. However, the results indicate that outsourcing experience of the client has a negative impact on contract outcome. One possible explanation is that since clients with more IT outsourcing experience are more likely to use an advisor such clients have less experience with IT projects.
Thus, IT outsourcing experience has a negative relationship with contract outcome. However, this finding requires further investigation. The purpose of relogit is to minimize the bias and not to obtain the best fit of the model. Thus the fit statistic of relogit is worse than that of the logit model. For the same reason, it's not reported or compared with the fit statistic of the logit model Zheng 1999a, 1999b 
